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ABSTRACT

Problem;

Can Henrik Ibsen's Hedda Cabler be expli

cated equally credibly using the contradictory concepts
of reality advocated by the contemporary philosophers

Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard and the novel ideas of Freud?
Is the artist equally capable of chronicling the history
of intellectual thought as the historian?
Research method and design:

Pertinent aspects of

each philosopher's concepts of reality were minutely com
pared with the Characters in Hedda Gabler to determine
the basic motivation for their acts.

Each of the three

philosophers' views were presented and reviewed in the
chronological order of their works and used as a measur
ing device to determine the feasiblity of the various
characters' motivations for their acts.

Conclusions:

The study shows conclusively that

the artist is equally capable of recording the history
of thought as the historian, even in his own milieu.
Ibsen created a piece of art that not only meshed the

contradictory concepts of Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard

in a single dramatic portrait, but even anticipated the
Freudian idea of reality.

He was further able to present

the dialectic antithesis of classicism and existentialism

which became the new synthesis--modern realism.
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After Peer Gvnt (I867), Ibsen remarked that never
again would drama be written in verse, and he turned to

other modes; ^ the publication of Hedda Gabler (I890)
followed the death throes of the Romantic movement.

This

thesis will examine the dianoia (thought) of Hedda Gabler
to determine whether it could be satisfactorily explicated
according to the views of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and

Freud.

The philosophies of these three men all exhibit

a similar sense of realism; Schopenhauer's biological
naturalism contains the same inherent deromanticizing

iconoclasm of Freud's psychological naturalism.

Both

views tend to reduce the transcendental possibilities ex
tolled by Romanticism and present man as a severely pro

scribed creature who can only ponder his impotence to cir

cumvent destiny.

Their views differ from Kierkegaard's

existentialism only to the extent that Kierkegaard's pro
vided some latitude, under the yoke of determinism,

where man might regain some of his lost nobility through
his courage to choose--within his narrowly proscribed
freedom--a line of action that disregards social pres

sures and might lead to an authentic "life."
The contrast between these predominantly pessimist

ic views and Romantic optimism is indicated in the name
ascribed to them--Realism.

It is generally agreed that

^ Eric Bentley, The Plavwright as Thinker (New
York: Harcourt Brace and World, 19^6), p. 91.

realism "began in the mid-nineteenth century, and that its
distinguishing characteristics are colloquial language,
the use of the "common" man's psychology, and "natural"

or plausi"ble action deriving from cause and effect sitnations.

Realism strained toward two tasks; to achieve

an exciting dramatic effect without violating a feeling
of "naturalness," and to achieve an elevation of the

spirit of expression.

This new and special kind of natur

alness, derived from scientific theories of the day,

claimed that men were deprived of free will and that
characters reacted to situations rather than precipitat

ing action.

Man's future "became a matter of the genetics

of Darwin and the social pressures described by August
Comte.

Nietszche's Zarathustra had just recently pro

nounced God dead and Schopenhauer had earlier apotheo
sized the will in the same fell stroke that had rendered

the intellect servant to instinct.

Comte, predicting

that social institutions develop along predictable patL

terns,

Freud postulating his historic and naturalistic

2

Kenneth MacGowen and William Melnitz, Golden

Ages of the Theater (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren
tice Hall, 1959), p. 61.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.

"Nietzsche," by Walter Kaufman.
i),

Jonathan H. Turner, The Structure of Sociolog

ical Theory (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 197^) P*
16.

paradigm of man, ^ Darwin, in his removal of that trans
cendental ingredient of Stardust as one of the basic

constituents of man, all relegated men to impotent con

clusions inherent in the vast and eternal premise or

nature of things. ^ Emile Zola and the Goncourt brothers
were busy reducing the artist to the level of mere chron
icler of the deplorable human condition, a condition de

riving from implacable social and psychological forces in
the innate human predilection for bestiality.
The dream lay shattered, and Schopenhauer the mis

anthrope gloated over his apparent prescience, leaving it
to the lone and introverted Kierkegaard to rescue from
the shattered hopes of European man a way in which the in
dividual might still escape the despair of impotence
through existentialist freedom of duty with passion.

In

to this tangled web of conflicting thought Ibsen nursed
into life the account of a woman beset with conflicting
ideas that eventually destroyed her.

It is a story of an

anachronistic and aristocratic woman trapped in the time

warp of incipient egalitarianism, a story of a natural

^ Encvclo-pedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.
"Sigmund Freud," by Alasdair Maclntyre.

^ Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Fav

ored Races in the Struggle for Life (n. p.; n. p.. IS'^O),
n. pag.

woman seeking escape from the demanding daemons of her im
perious and instinctual will through the therapy of mar
riage and generation, a story of a nineteen-century Per
sephone attempting to gather souls for Lord Dis.

Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea (1819) ^
was a frontal attack on the basic romantic idealism of

Hegel's view that mankind might eventually attain the Uto
pian perfection postulated centuries earlier by Christ
ianity.

But while Hegel's dialectical triads leaned heav

ily upon intellectual methodology, Schopenhauer derided
the intellect as a mere instrument of desire, and as

serted that the will is the ilan vital of man.

It was

not, however, the free will the theologians spoke so ap
provingly of.

It was rather a striving, persistent will

of imperious desire which employed intellect to ration
alize the propriety of possession of a thing desired.

And

when reason no longer served a man he could with impunity
desert reason.

All life is strife, cried the pessimistic Schop
enhauer; a clash of wills--except when man makes the twoO

backed beast.

The reproductive organs are the proper

7

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea,
trans. Konstantin Kolenda (New York: The Bobbs Merrill

Company, Inc., I96O), p. 7^

® Will Durant, Story of Philoso-phv (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1926), p. 256.

focus of the will and form the opposite pole to the brain

which represents knowledge.

This is why, he reasoned,

the Greeks worshipped the phallus and the Hindus the lin

gam.

Hesiod and Parmenides said that Eros is the first,

the creator, and the principle from which all things

proceed (Durant, p. 256).

The principle matter is not

the reciprocation of love, but possession.

Nature is

the best eugenics and love is a deception practiced by
nature, a deception which must vanish after the attain

ment of the end of the species.

If Petrarch's passion

had been sated, his song would have been silenced.

Lov

borg's passion culminated in his aborted manuscript,
Hedda's in death.

Yet, argues Schopenhauer, will defeats even death
by the strategy and martyrdom of reproduction, observ

able in the spider who is eaten by the female he has

just fertilized, the wasp who devotes itself to gathering
food for the offspring it will never see and the man who
wears himself to ruin in the effort to feed, clothe and

educate his children (Durant, p. 258).

There is some

thing of nature perverted here, for Hedda does not dem
onstrate this dedication to progeny, though Thea does.

Hedda, however, patently shows she possesses a ravening,
yet perverted eros force, an irresistible urge to pro
create that another generation would call the libido,

its restless energy sublimated into art and architecture.

6

Ibsen was aware that the attraction of the sexes might
manifest itself in astonishing garb.

In masterful strokes

this taciturn Scandinavian built with the glowing medium
of symbol and irony a tale of perverse libido, where

eros metamorphosed into thanatos.

Hedda, incipient nat

ural mother, beset with the strangling injunctions of a

repressive society, was incapable of integrating the two
opposite forces loosed within her.

On the one hand, her

elan vital. the Schopenhaueran indominatable will, raged
(

in the cavern of her being like some Freudian Scylla
whose only raison was the entrapment of masculine gam
etes.

And on the other hand, her intellect—servant,

said Schopenhauer, of desire--shaped by repressive social
forces whose objective it was to preserve the many even
at the expense of the few, cringed at the thought that

appetite might defy society.

Will and intellect, Scylla

and Charybdis, parasites of the flesh, housed in the same
host; here was a scenario for conflict.

But how is it that intellect, lately declared

thrall to will, should find itself arrayed against its
master?

Enigmatically, Schopenhauer, the philosophical

prestidigitator, pronounced intellect the Oedipus of fa
ther will, who rose up and slew his progenitor (Durant,

p. 262).

The trick is, said our misogynist, simply to

defeat the desire to live, for who escapes back into

timelessness escapes also the pain of living; it is a

view reminiscent of Ecclesiastes. and not unlike the Budd

hists' Nirvana.

Here the audacious philosopher offers his

piece de resistance, suicide, although it was a solution
Schopenhauer himself did not utilise.

The philosopher,

argued Schopenhauer, need not seek refuge in the land of

shadows to escape the slavering appetite.

In him reason

has teamed with intelligence to cool the fires of desire
and allow the man to live out his days in the contempla
tion of the despair inherent in the human condition.

No

thing could have "been further from Hedda's situation.

No

philosopher would have dallied tantalizingly with Judge
Brack, would have toyed with the bird-like Mrs. Elvsted's

fears, would have encouraged Eilert Lovborg to disregard
his lust for liquor, would have denied the very exist
ence of love.

No, Hedda's intellect was still thrall to will,

and her fear of social repression was simply a declara

tion of subjection to a force that held the power of life

and death over her (ostracism).

But Hedda was cunning,

and she found relief in the manipulation of those around
her.

It is a short step from Schopenhauer's "will to

live" to Nietszche's "will to power" and can be taken, I
believe, without violating Schopenhauer's fundamental

views.

Hedda, admittedly an impotent coward, sought con

trol over the members of the very group she feared. Aunt
Julie and Berta were insignificant pawns in her power

8

game.

Tesman seduced into a sterile marriage, Eilert,

manipulated to the point of moribundity, and Thea, whose
very namesake suggests innocence and faith, fri^tened
by the envious Hedda's threat to yank her passionate red

hair—symbolic yearning for the courage that passion
lends one's acts.

Here is the Schopenhaueran tension between the will
and the intellect, with will representing desire or in
stinct and intellect representing the forced imposition
Q

of social restraints upon the innocents of "Arcadia."

Ibsen, polarizing this tension, creates multiple layers
of conflict, and Hedda contains both polarities of this
schism.

She is, in fact, schizophrenic and the two per

sonalities are locked in combat.

The final "leap", her

rejection of life, along with the circumspection with
which she weighed all her acts--her caution, if you will-

are indicators that the intellect has gained supremacy,
a fact she frequently laments.

One cannot disregard

the supreme irony; the fact that she meets her death
through the destruction of the organ of sapience, the

brain, while Lovborg the sensual man, the man of appe
tites, the man whose will directs him,surrenders his

9

A green world of pastoral simplicity and hap
piness, such as Eden, where the innocents experience an
idyllic and sequestered life.

life to an accidental (nonintellectualized) slug through
the bowels, the organ of sentience.

Hedda's death, with

the hallmarks of ratiocination, and Lovborg's accidental

death following surrender to his appetite for wine and
women, obey with startling clarity the Schopenhaueran
paradigm of "reality."
And yet, Hedda is not totally cerebral.

Where

every species fights for the matter space and time of

others--in the Schopenhauer reality, homo homini lunis-

man is wolf to man (Durant, p. 256).

Hedda is certainly

a wolf to Eilert, robbing him of life, and wolf to Tesman,

wooing him into a sterile marriage.

Her bite, not unlike

that of the lycanthrope, transforms the bumbling Tesman

into an equally unethical wolf condoning her destruction
of Eilert's manuscript, since it will lead to his own ap

pointment at the university.

And Brack!

Here is the

quintessential wolf, hiding his lupine essence beneath
the black robes of justice, as he cautiously insinuates
himself into the sacrosanct area of Hedda's marriage.

Hedda's predominant intellectualism exorcises

passion and transforms her into a coward fearful of ex
ercising her will.

It contrasts keenly with Thea's

predominant elan vital.

This woman of desires--wearing

her mane of red hair as a badge--impetuously leaves her
husband and his children to follow Lovborg, and tells

Hedda she could not help what she did, that she did what

10

she had to do.

Here is the Schopenhauer earth mother.

"Woman is the culprit here; for when knowledge has reach
ed to will-lessness, her thoughtless charms allure man

again into reproduction.

Youth has not intelligence

enough to see how brief these charms must be; and when

the intelligence comes, it is too late." (Durant, p. 266)
Ibsen has inverted and distorted this Schopen
haueran utterance by presenting Eilert's manuscript as

a product of his and Thea's sublimated erotic energy.
The transformation of this symbolic child into a product

of the intellect makes the manuscript no less a product
of eros.

Irony is piled upon irony, like Ossa upon Pe

lion, for it is Hedda—pregnant by the bumbling Tesman-
who might have participated in such an intellectual birth.

How she lamented her exclusion from this erotic congress!
Schopenhauer concurred with the ancient utterance

that who increases knowledge increases sorrow, adding

that the genius suffers most.

Memory and foresight mere

ly add tjoe the misery (witness Prometheus' plight), and
most of our suffering lies in retrospect and anticipation;
and Hedda the circumspect, Hedda the intellectual, was

born to suffer.

Life is a pendulum that swings between

the pain of want and the ennui of temporary satiation

(Durant, p. 258).

To combat the deadly ennui she plays

an even more deadly game of manipulation.

Ironically she finds a confessor in Judge Brack.

11

She admits her ennui, admits her fatigue, admits she has
married Tesman "because it was the line of least resist

ance and because she had begun to fear for her social

status.

Trapped in the Schopenhaueran ennui, re

duced to the role of incubator, conscious of her quint

essential powerlessness, hoping, as she continues to

test the power of her will against the chain of events
which become increasingly impossible to control, she

feels the parasite within her, and her rebellious intel
lect rejects that part of herself over which she has no
control.

Again ironically, it is the flesh which she

would destroy that gives sustenance to the intellect.
The Schopenhaueran view emphasises Ibsen's use

of irony, and the irony in this play is ubiquitous.

Even

as Hedda, with wilfull if shortsighted hubris, seeks the
status of the classic heroine, her cowardice limits her

to manipulations and vicarious participation in Eilerfs
success and failure, and the very fear of scandal suggests

a sterile impotency as the fetus grows within her.

The

general's pistols, a traditional symbol of the phallus,
are instruments of sterile death; Hedda, a woman biolog

ically, has the aspirations of a man.

The thanatos urge

toward death is expressed by a woman who nurses new life

Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler, trans, unknown

(New York! Random House, I890), p. 5^3
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in her womb.

She who seeks power so desperately is denied

it because of a rationalized cowardice, while Thea is a

powerful influence on Eilert and George because of her nonrationalized fearlessness.

Judge Brack, the administrator

of justice admits he has no objection to backways—trans
lated as underhanded courses—and repudiates his social
function of law and order.

An upright ethical doctor of

anthropology, George Tesman, conceals the burning of the
manuscript, and his act leads indirectly to the death of
Lovborg.

There is yet another view of Hedda's actions, ap

propriately described by Soren Kierkegaard, which provides
some release from the unrelenting pessimism characteris

tic of Schopenauer's views.

Kierkegaard viewed the

Schopenaueran despair as only a response to the threat
of meaninglessness.

He viewed this despair as only an

expression of the loss of hope; the answer to which he
asserted, was neither in hedonism (which both Hedda and

Lovborg had previously practiced) nor in speculative
and abstract thought such as the writing of anthropo

logical treatises (Ibsen, p. 518).

One must turn inward,

said Kierkegaard, into the subjective self, into the mic
rocosm, where one finds earnestness, decision, passion

Encvclonedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.

Soren Kierkegaard," by Alasdair Maclntyre.

13

commitment, and the freedom to gain unification.

Your

own despair will direct you to your subjective self (MacIntyre, Kierkegaard, p. 509)•

Lovborg found earnestness

and passion in his literary creation, and yet he was am
bivalent, for, though he was a passionate man, he was
also an intellectual, a scholar.

Man's despair, asserted Kierkegaard, intensifies
his subjectivity—his turning within—and makes it a
gateway to the authentic self, as Lovborg's despair,
evident in his surrender to alcoholism, becomes a cata

lyst toward the discovery of his genuine self.

In em

bracing that despair, the self gives birth to itself

and passes from the Kierkegaardian esthetical (childish)
stage of indecision to the ethical stage of decisive com
mitment.

One is responsible only when he makes a choice,

said Kierkegaard, and the ethicality of his choice de
pends upon the degree to which it is drawn from within,
rather than from established standards (a criterionless

choice) posited solely upon non-social aspects (Maclntyre,
Kierkegaard, p. 509)
In 1843 Kierkegaard published the curious two
volume Either/Or; A Fragment of Life, in which he ex
pounded what has since been called the first statement

of the existentialist idea.

His father, urging him into

theology for which Kierkegaard felt no affinity, was in
strumental in his eventual rejection of all rationalized

14

systems.

12

Systems, he reasoned--and Hegel's was the

quintessence of all that he deplored--forced the indivi
dual into a pre-formed mold,

13

^ forcing personal develop

ment along strict and inflexible lines with no considera
tion for the individuality of the person.

14

He rejected the construction of systems and con

cepts, laying the utility of any particular concepts upon
the will of the individual.
responsibility is his.

All hinges on choice, hence,

The inherent paradox led Kierke

gaard to publish several contradictory treatises under
various noms-de-plume; only in such a manner could he
avoid the charge that he too was preaching a concept or
system.

Kierkegaard maintains that every individual is

12

Whether Kierkegaard's father sought guilt with
the gusto of the flagellant, his son, born old, shouldered
the burden of his society, and sadly renounced his own
marriage plans for a life of ethics and religion, even as
he extolled the virtues of marriage for the ethical man.
13

Hegel's system was a closed system (even though

it progressed toward Utopia) in that the intellectual con
cept gave his dialectic the very form that the existent
ialist decried. "I shall shape my own essence," said the
existentialist. "And I shall do it with passion, not cold
intellect."
14

The classical view encompassing Naturalism,

Romanticism and Rationalism, positing essence before ex
istence, is shattered by this existentialistic approach
which stresses the freedom and uniqueness of the indivi

dual to move from class to class, profession to profession
and hence to his own authenticity.

15

confronted with the choice of leading the aesthetic or

the ethical life.

The aesthetic way is a sophisticated

and romantic hedonism, an ever-frustrating pursuit of
diversion and pleasure in sexual libertinism, travel,
or the arts.

Each new experience draws him closer to

the day when there are no new diversions and he has lit

terally done it all.

He is now thrown back upon nostalgia

and sentimentality, as he attempts to relive those excit
ing first experiences.

Just as Hedda becomes aware that

she is jaded, "...danced myself tired."

(Ibsen, p. 538),

the aesthete comes to realize that his search for novelty
has led him to the threshold of despair.

In Purify

Your Hearts! Kierkegaard says, "See him in his season of
pleasure.

Did he not crave for one pleasure after anoth

er, variety his watchword?" (Maclntyre, Kierkegaard, p.
509), Desire has blunted the pain of self-awareness, but
as the person is forced to turn more frequently toward
reminiscence, he is forced back toward that same conscious

ness from which he sought escape.

Recoiling from the despair of aestheticism one

In Either/Or the young person who has chosen
the aesthetic, "...has not chosen himself; like Narcissus

he has only fallen in love with himself. Such a situation
has certainly ended not infrequently in suicide." Kierke

gaard, Either/Or. I, p. 36.
•j ^

Also in many pages of Hedda Gabler. Hedda re
iterates again and again the failure of her headlong but
failed flight into hedonism.

16

will eventually, and with total freedom of choice, elect
the ethical way of life.

Marriage, hints Kierkegaard,

is an excellent institution in which one finds a satis

factory ethical way of life, for here lies the sphere of
duty, universal rules, unconditional demands and tasks.

17

The choice is made with passion and has no criterion, but,
he adds paradoxically, were the choice wrong, the inten
sity of the passion will correct any error.

18

The con

tradictory and paradoxical quality of Kierkegaard's views

are patent—which is not to say that such views are inap
plicable to the explication of Hedda Gabler; for one eas
ily divines that the primary difference between Schopen
hauer and Kierkegaard's views is the concept of freedom
of choice.

It is important to indicate that the Ibsen

characters are not consciously Kierkegaardian and Schopen

haueran in thought.

These paradigms are useful only in

casting them in a more illuminating perspective.

That is

^ It must be clear, however, that this does not
approximate the confining system such as constructed by

Hegel. Kierkegaard took extreme precautions by publish
ing many and contradictory views under various pen names
so he might avoid the criticism surely to be provoked by

his paradoxical statements; namely of the construction of
a system concomitant with his repudiation of systems.
1 R

It would appear that, were one intellectually

convinced of the error in a contemplated action, and one

resolutely committed oneself to such an action, passion
must be an absolutely necessary ingredient of such act.
Hence, Kierkegaard's paradox of passion tends to weaken

one's urge to charge Hedda with insufficient passion in
her cerebrated suicide.

17

to sayf for example, that Hedda does not lament her selfawareness as a source of anguish, hut we the viewers sus

pect that were she perhaps less self-conscious, her des
pair would decrease correspondingly.

Using the degree of self-awareness as a criter
ion, one might hypothesize a hierarchy of anguish in the
characters of Hedda Gahler.

One might even determine

which of the characters seeks, with the greatest urgency,

surcease from pain.

Permit me to tarry for a moment and

contemplate the propriety of comparing the degree of in
dividual anguish with the degree of this consciousness
of self.

Hedda is a cerebral individual, who admittedly

finds pleasure in the repartee with Judge Brack.

Con

sciousness increases with intelligence, and they may well

"be one and the same thing.

This is the old paradoxical

bugaboo of the existentialists; the organ of thought at

tempting to shape being into a concept or system.

Being

refuses to yield to system and absurdity is the result.
To defeat absurdity is to repudiate consciousness;

Hed

da's answer to this paradox is self-annihilation.
Lovborg, however, cannot be so inextricably caught

up in his anguish, for did he not (albeit under the in
spiration of Thea) create the manuscript--symbol of cere
bration?

With the inspiration of sublimated eros he has

created, and only by accident does he find death, iron

ically with the symbolic phallus, the dueling pistol.

If

18

anguish is equal to cerebration, Hedda is the greater suf
ferer, for only the most desperate seek escape through su
icide.

Thea is not cerebral, but the consummate female,

whose raison

is a catalyst by virtue of inspiration.

Her anguish is minimal for two reasons; first, she gives
her passions free rein, and no internal schisms tear her

apart.

She is thrall to her passions and ergo free in

the Kierkegaardian sense.

Secondly, she is so caught up

in her commitment to duty--toward her child, the manu

script--that she has removed herself from the aesthetic
phase of life in favor of the ethical stage.
Hedda finds herself in the aesthetic phase of

development, immobilized there, it seems, in stasis.

Kierkegaard's remark that these individuals not infreq
uently resort to suicide, is remarkably apropos.

So also

is Hedda's confession to Judge Brack, that she has grown
tired, that she had married Tesman simply because it was
the easiest thing to do and that she had begun to fear

for her social status (Ibsen, p. 5^0).

She is guilty of

the very crime that led Kierkegaard to formulate his con

cepts--acquiescence and conformity to the values of
others, and she is all that Kierkegaard has rejected, for

not only does she conform to the community ethic--at

least on the surface--but she then methodically attempts
to dictate the acts of her peers.

19

Hedda's refusal to follow the pathway to her auth

enticity through the repudiation of social strictures is
still a choice and the fact of this choice makes her re

sponsible for her predicament.

Unlike Schopenhauer's

baited bear raging against the stings of unfeeling na
ture, Hedda cannot take strength in the knowledge that

one more powerful than she has meted out this suffering.
She is a coward, fearful of choosing the only path that

can lead her to authenticity, for she does not know that

sufficient passion would have neutralized any cause for

fear. What a pity she had not read Either/Or!
Why, one muses, is Thea courageous and Hedda not

courageous?

Hedda remarks to her "Oh, if you could only

understand how poor I am.

And fate made you so rich...

I have such a fear of scandal." (Ibsen, p. 558)

The be

lief that Hedda's dilemma (her cowardice) can be correct
ed forms much of the dialectic tension in the play.

One

senses that her absence of courage is a matter of choice.

She is "guilty" of cowardice--damning for a general's
daughter.

On the other hand, how can one beset by her

biological limitations be deemed guilty?

This paradox

is the dramatic core of Hedda Gabler.

Kierkegaard has suggested that man can redeem

himself through courage (Maclntyre, Kierkegaard, p. 338).
In fact he made much of courage, though he spent pre

cious little time identifying the source of the stuff.
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It is implied that courage is innate, that it is present
in the pre-essence stage of existence.

Although care

fully skirting the hogs of philosophical arguement, I
am compelled to remark that throu^out Hedda Gabler
there is the pervading sense that Hedda can find the
courage she yearns for.

"Ah, yes...courage.

If only

one had that!...Then life would perhaps be liveable af
ter all." (Ibsen, p. 558)

She has simply refused to ap

ply Kierkegaard's antidote to despair, has refused to

permit the despair to lead her to subjective discovery
of self, of commitment, passion, and authenticity.

In

her attempt to manipulate Thea and Lovborg she functions
as the instrument of social pressures, the very type of

external pressure Kierkegaard warns against, the very
source of her own fatal inability to makes choices for
herself.

Eilert's choice is not a product of his reason.
On the contrary, he chooses with passion to dance about
the flame of lust and, like a moth, he falls.

Rescued

from the fens of alcoholism through his symbolic mar

riage to Thea, through the application of his intellect
in the creation of their mutual child, the manuscript,

he is well along the road of the ethical vision of life,
when he is swept away backward into the maelstrom of
Hedda's destructive aestheticism.

His "choice" is ob

viously wrong, and although Kierkegaard holds that there
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can be no wrong choice, he adds, paradoxically that suf

ficient passion can correct any wrongness in choice.
Eilert's intensity insufficient?

Was

One senses here a weak

ness in the existential paradigm.
Thea's character is perhaps more amenable.

Walk

ing away from her husband, she defies society as she
throws herself at the feet of a man who has been a target
of social criticism.

Passion, symbolized by her red

hair, is in her every act.

She has inspired Lovborg to

creativity and discovered her authentic self--which is

the consummate woman, inspiring a man to create.

Inspir

ation is her forte, and, promptly after Lovborg's demise,
she transfers her attention to Tesman, who has taken up

the task of resurrecting the manuscript (Ibsen, p. 600).
Though fear and timidity mark her personality, she makes
her way cautiously through the play without regard for
propriety.

Brack is simply an unauthenticated person, who
makes no progress toward or away from any redeemable

stance.

Tesman, not a particularly multi-faceted person

ality, bumbles through all five acts in a state of semi-

consciousness, either attempting to satiate Hedda's

in

satiable discontent, or, in the end, to repair the damage
caused by her devouring flame.

To this extent, one would

have to place Tesman also in the ranks of the unauthenti

cated, even though he sought, as Kierkegaard dictated.

22

the ethical life of marriage.

One is tempted to place

Miss Julie in the realm of the ethical vision.

She

nurses her other spinster sister toward as painless a
death as she can manage.
A pattern begins to emerge, with Thea represent

ing the positive expression of Kierkegaard's criterionless choice drawn from within and not from social crit

eria.

Bound in matrimony to the sheriff, she turns away

from him toward Lovborg in an act that might (outside
Kierkegaard's views) have been termed unethical or im
moral.

Her statement that she cannot live as though

she had never known Eilert can, according to the Kierke
gaardian paradigm, be interpreted as a measure of her

courage (Ibsen, p. 525)'

it is an ethical choice, and,

at the same time, it is contrary to established social
standards of action.

It is ethical because it is drawn

from the essence of her being, and her symbolic child,
the manuscript, is her raison d'^etre.

Witness the nim

bleness with which she switches her attention from the

dead Eilert to the living George when she learns that
the manuscript can be resurrected.

tional;

Her courage is func

it is the staying power that sustains the elan

vital. the will to live and propagate the species.
It might appear that we have come full circle to

the biological criteria inherent in Schopenhauer's views.
Lovborg's alcoholism clouds the quality of his fateful
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choice to attend the drinking party, and leaves the reader
to decide whether his choice comes from the tyranny of
his "biology or from social pressures.

His weakness for

the grape and his vanity, exploited "by Hedda's psycho
logical manipulation, com'bine to create ambivalent causes

for his choice to attend the party that leads directly
to his death.

Hedda's choice of suicide is also not a clear com

mand from her milieu, her society.

In that sense it is

ethical and appears to emanate from within.

And yet,

the dread of ostracization may be genetic in man the so
cial creature.

Lovborg's alcoholism, a hybrid creation

of biology and social pressures, like Hedda's fear of
scandal, another curious hybrid, assumes with her fear a

thematic kinship in the Kierkegaardian-Schopenhaueran para
dox.

Each of these two philosophers has declared for the

reality of subjectivism, one for a tyrannical one, the
other for a subjective free will.

While Schopenhauer

might have applauded Hedda for her courage in the fin
al suicidal act and muttered, "Lucky man," of Eilert's

accidental death, Kierkegaard might have lamented them
both.

For he believed that man seeks to escape himself

through his ceaseless becoming, and that the only sub

jective truth emerges from man's faithfulness to his own
unique self; Lovborg, succumbing to her machinations, ig
noring his own physical limitations, went proudly to
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his own demise.

The two philosophers are fundamentally alike in

that either view is capable of explicating Hedda Gahler

in terms of will; Schopenauer's biological determinism
is bleak and repressive in its implication that escape
lies only in suicide.

Paradoxically Hedda appears en

trapped between the Kierkegaardian aesthetic stage,
where hedonism and boredom are the metaphors and the

opposite extreme of Schopenhauer's philosophy, cognizant
of her enslavement and planning escape through suicide.
The primary motive for Hedda's "leap" can be

interpreted equally well from either philosophical stance.
Schopenhauer, as the consummate egoist, has asserted that
suicide is the best answer for the human dilemma,

unless one is a philosopher able to reconcile appetite
with intellect and escape the puppeteer nature.

In this

view, Hedda, not a philosopher, is excruciatingly aware
of her overwhelming impotence and takes the recommended

escape.

If, however, one regards Hedda as the aesthete,

beset with the angst of ennui and turned in on herself

in a self-conscious and tautological nothingness, she

exemplifies Kierkegaard's prophecy that the narcissistic
individual must end in self destruction.
Hedda Gabler is lavish with allusions to death.

It is suggested through characterization, as Hedda be
comes death's minister; it is there in the movement of
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the plot; it is present in the old house, pungent with

an "odour of mortality." (Ibsen, p. 519)

The house pre

viously owned by now deceased aristocracy is now occupied

by the motherless daughter of a death-dealing general

(now also deceased) and bound in sterile matrimony to
a man whose only relatives are sterile, spinster aunts,
one of whom passes away during the play.

Relevant too

is the subject of George's creation (his own onus magnum)
which, like Hedda's fetus, never reaches fruition; it is
a look backward toward the Middle Ages, a disinterment
of the dead industries of the ancient society of Brabant,

a microcosmic representation of the play we are watching

and the society we see disintegrating before us.

The in

stitutions represented by Judge Brack, by General Gabler,

the university, even by Sheriff Elvsted are failing, its
members sterile and impotent.
Hedda personifies the spector of death even as
it closes about her.

Ibsen describes her as pale of com

plexion, with steel gray eyes expressing a cold, unruf
fled repose; and with death's characteristic love of

gloom, she carps about the sunlight (Ibsen, p. 511)•
Oh--there the servant has gone

and opened the veranda door and
let in a whole flood of sunlight.
She is acutely conscious that this is the season of death

(Ibsen, p. 51^)'
(...calm and mistress of herself.)
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I am looking at the leaves. They are so
withered...to think of it!--Already in
September.
Her interest in death transcends considerably an interest

in just her own.

Seen loading her father's dueling pis

tols at the beginning of Act II, she threatens to kill

Judge Brack (Ibsen, p. 517)•

It is an oversimplification

to suggest that justice shall die, for the Aristotelian
"thought" of Hedda Gabler indicates that the angst assoc
iated with living--broached by both Schopenhauer and

Kierkegaard--is beyond a matter of justice.
Hedda makes a heated denial of any interest in

life, when Lovborg remarks that she has a craving for
life.

"Take care I

Believe nothing of the sort." she

responds (Ibsen, p. 5^3)-

She delights in the idea of

death.

Now I am burning your child, Thea!
Burning it curly locks!...Your child
and Eilert Lovborg's...I am burning—

I am burning your child.

(Ibsen, p. 583)

Her frustrated attempts to move Eilert to a glorious
suicide is an attempt to impose over his eventual "cas
ual" end a heroic but anacronistic defiance in the face

of insuperable odds.

Her view is essentially romantic

and nonfunctional in light of the Schopenhaueran reality,

for biological determinism reduces her dream to tragic
irony.

Defying the determinism inherent in Eilert's al

coholism, and failing to move him to conquer this irre
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sistible sequence of cause and effect, she retreats back
ward toward the final precipice.

In a final spasm of de

spair and defiance, she attempts to wrest herself from the
strait jacket of determinism with suicide even as she as

sumes the role of fate (the very nemesis she flees) and
destroys the unborn child.

The very rationalization that

leads her to suicide and freedom dooms her fetus to the
determinism she has sought to evade.
In the end her suicide leaves unanswered the ex

istential question of free will.

Though she defied fate

with her own death, the taking of the life of her child-
which has an existence of sorts, though perhaps not yet

an essence—makes it a totally impotent cog in a total

ly deterministic reality.

It may be that Ibsen cleverly

left the final decision to the subjective and individual
choice of the reader.

There are other manifestations of death in Hedda

Gabler.

Tesman also has a penchant for things dead.

When

he responds to Lovborg that he would never have thought
of writing of the future, Hedda pointedly remarks, "H'm—

I dare say not." (Ibsen, p. 5^8)

And Aunt Julie discov

ers her raison d'etre in nursing her sister to the end.
Her death was so calm, so beautiful.

And

she had the unspeakable happiness of

seeing George once more--and bidding him

good-bye. (Ibsen, p. 585)
and later:
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I must prepare my dear one for
her rest as well as I can.

She

shall go to her grave looking
her best. (Ibsen, p. 585)
That one look one's best in death perhaps speaks for

Hedda's social stratum.

The splendid powdered corpse

is a manifestation of the socially proper facade, of

a penchant for propriety at least partially responsible
for Hedda's flight into suicide.
Miss Julie needs the reality of impending death

to provide her own life with meaning.
Oh, there's always some poor
invalid or other in want of nursing, un

fortunately...A burden!

Heaven forgive

you child--It is no burden to me.

(Ibsen, p. 585)
She openly admits her need for the dying.
Oh, one soon makes friends with
the sick; and its such an absolute
necessity for me to have some one to

live for. (Ibsen, p. 585)
Death for Hedda, arrives as the existentialist

choice though it appears as the coward's choice.

It is

the only choice for one who yearns for the power of
life and death over others, yet fears the consequences
of social scandal.

There is an odd mixture of the ri

diculous (fear of scandal) and the sublime (love of
death) tempting one to consider Hedda's destruction as
a result of a psychotic frenzy induced by external forces,

transforming what at first appears as a wilful suicide
into cosmic cause and effect.

One is also hard put to
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accredit Lovborg's death to anything except cosmic acci
dent, but it might be easily seen as the Schopenhaueran
accident, the result of his biological trajectory.

In

this sense, Lovborg's death is no more nor less accident
al than was Hedda's.

Ibsen's drama leaves the viewer to

decide.

In collecting philosophical thought useful in
the explication of Hedda Gabler, quite by happenstance,
I encountered a remarkably pertinent explication in

Freud's Thanatos myth.

Freud postulates that the will

to death, thanatos, opposes and eventually defeats eros.

In this paradigm, eros vies with thanatos, and the po
larization of these two psychic forces are lucidly pre
sented in Hedda's characterization; The eros force is

evident in her pregnancy on the biological level, while
her suicide suggests the thanatos paradigm is at work.
It may be that a Freudian analysis is not appro

priate because he is not coeval with Ibsen.

There is

nonetheless a relevance here between this tragedy and

the Freudian reduction of the hitherto somewhat mystic

human spirit--capable, in earlier literature, of apo
theosis or at least of a glorious heroism--to a psycho

logical equation of predictable and ironic helplessness.
A severely

limits

circumscribed will operating within narrow

produces a self-willed suicide.

In this Aris

totelian tragedy, as Joseph Wood Krutch proclaimed, is
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indeed dead.

19

The differences between Schopenhauer and Kierke
gaard are not differences that would either move man

back to a milieu where the old classic tragedy would
again be possible, or provide him with total freedom,

or even totally abandon him to fate.

They are merely ar

guments as to whether man has even one little iota of

freedom, in his choice of either enduring the despair
of life or defying destiny through the existentialist

leap (suicide).

Because Freud's ideas continue the

trend toward the increased circumscription of the hu

man will I have included a Freudian explication of Hedda
Gabler.

Freud discovered a syndrome of behavior traits
common to the necrophile, and these characteristics are

strikingly similar to Hedda's.

He notes a retention of

the anal stage of development, related to the way the

child acted in the sphere of bowel movements as a res
ponse to demands by his trainers.

During an early phase

of childhood development, after the mouth is no longer
the main organ of lust or satisfaction, the anus becomes

an important erogenous zone, and most libidinal wishes

19

Krutch's funeral oration was not directed at

the more modern type of ironic tragedy in which the vic
tim has been deprived of volition and hence responsibil
ity for his fall.
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are centered around the retention of the excrements.

PO

This anal hoarding character is orderly in a sterile and
rigid manner and cannot endure insecurity (Fromm, p. 29^).

Hedda remarks: "It is this genteel poverty I have managed

to drop into—!

It makes life so pitiable!

ridiculous!" (Ibsen, p. 5^^)*

So utterly

Freud's reduction of Hed

da's heroic ideals to an anal hoarding syndrome makes
of her a defenseless heroine with a will no freer than

the alcoholic Lovborg's, in fact, no freer than her own
fetus.

The anal hoarding personality can only feel safe
by possession and control, since it is incapable of re
lating through love and productivity.

Hedda must also

possess and control those around her (Fromm, p. 29^)•
One of the most pivotal bits in the play occurs when Hed
da manipulates Eilert into taking a drink against his
judgment; at another time she cries, "I want for once

in my life to have power to mould a human destiny." (Ib

sen, p. 5^^)

Later, "She drags

Mrs. Elvsted almost by

force toward the middle doorway." (Ibsen, p. 5^3)

She

admits to Brack: "...I made use of Tesman..." (Ibsen, p.
563)•

To Eilert she remarks that she does not love

George, explaining that she broke off her former rela

20

Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructive

ness (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), P* 29^
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tionship with Eilert "because it threatened to develop

into something more serious (Ibsen, p. 555)'

When Brack

suggests that Hedda loves George she responds, vehement

ly, "Faugh--don't use that sickening word!" (Ibsen, p.
533).
There is also a close relationship to sadism;
Thea reminds Hedda that when they were in school she was

always pulling Thea's hair, "...and once you said you

would "burn it off my head." (I"bsen, p. 521)
The necrophilous character is determined "by an
increase in narcissism, unrelatedness (or alienation)
and destructiveness, which is the malignant form of the

anal character, and the language of such a person is char

acterized "by frequent use of words referring to destruc
tion (Fromm, p. 294).

Witness her threats to Thea; she

threatens Brack, urges suicide upon Lovborg, and eventual

ly destroys herself and her fetus.

There is also a direct

connection between destruction itself and the manner or

technique of the process (Fromm, p. 344).

Hedda is in

sistent that Eilert shoot himself in the temple, the or

gan of the intellect; she is wretched when she learns that
he died of a visceral wound.

Even suicide has technique.

If the necrophile is provided with a satisfactory
solution, such as prestige and admiration, to an exces
sive narcissism, the contained destructiveness may never

be overtly expressed in any significant way (Fromm, p.
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365)'

While single Hedda enjoyed countless admirers, but

after marriage, tradition required that her personality be
subordinate to the somewhat insipid George Tesman.

If the

necrophile fails to obtain prestige, the malignant as

pect will manifest itself in a craving for destruction

(Fromm, p. 36^), and the minimal recognition Hedda re
ceived was not sufficient.

Necrophilia is the outcome

of an unlived life or the failure to arrive at a stage
beyond narcissism and indifference.

If one cannot crack

the shell of his total narcissism he can only escape
the unbearable sense of vital impotence and nothingness
by affirming himself in the act of destruction of the

life that he has not been able to create (Fromm, p. 36^).
Ironically Hedda is impotently creating a new life in her
womb.

But these Freudian views are so pertinent to Hed

da's dilemma that they are the basis for almost every mod
ern interpretation of the role.
Other traits of the necrophile are boredom, schiz
ophrenia, cold aloofness, a specific attitude toward the

past and property, and a predilection for dark rooms.
Not the least dangerous result of insuf

ficiently compensated boredom is violence
and destructiveness...such persons have no

interest in anything... or

anybody except

of the most superficial kind.

(Fromm, p. 339)

They only see gray skies and have little zest for life.
In fact they would often rather be dead.

philous people are very dangerous.

Severely necro

They are the haters
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who favor bloodshed and destruction (Fromm, p. 339)•
Ennui is a prime characteristic of Hedda.

She

admits she has the facility for "...boring myself to

death." (Ibsen, p. 5^5)

And she later remarks; "...oh,

my dear Mr. Brack how mortally bored I have been." (Ib
sen, p. 537)

She also exhibits the necrophile's sym

tom of schizophrenia.

When Tesman asks her why she is

cruel to Aunt Julia, she answers: "(nervously crossing
the room).

Well, you see--these impulses come over me

all of a sudden; and I cannot resist them." (Ibsen, p.
5^1)

Her reason for marrying Tesman when she did not
love him is typical; "I had...danced myself tired...my

day was done--(With a slight shudder). Oh, no--I won't
say that, nor think it either," (Ibsen, p. 538)

It is

evident early on that her rational personality is in mor
tal combat with the necrophilous personality.

The necrophile's penchant for acquiring property
is evident too.

Hedda has so much luggage that there is

no room on the carriage for Tesman's aunt.

Later she re

marks that the old piano no longer fits the decor, but

when Tesman suggests they exchange it, she will not part

with it; "No, no—no exchange.
it.

I don't want to part with

Suppose we put it there in the inner room and then

get another here in its place."

(Ibsen, p. 515)

The ne

crophilous person generally has a preference for colors
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such as black or brown that absorb light, and a distaste
for bright radiant colors.

I have earlier pointed out

Hedda's penchant for closed draperies and gloomy rooms.

Finally the Freudian concept of inversion ex

plains Hedda's will to power.

The general's portrait

dominates the set over the sofa.

She is a biological

woman yearning for power in a milieu where power can only
be seized by a man.

Her will for power, rather than for

progeny, suggests the mind of a man, a genetic anomaly
imprisoned in the body of a woman in nineteenth-century
Europe.

I have attempted to show how the advent of the

realistic period was precipitated by the accumulating
data from the various centers of philosophical thought

prevalent in the nineteenth-century community of inquiry
such as the Naturalists, Rationalists and the Psycholo

gists.

While aristocratic man, even omnipotent God, was

debilitated, the common man--despite the excesses and
failures of the French revolution--began to emerge on a

hi^er level of the social status.

The general consensus

was that if aristocratic man could be reduced to the de

terministic equation, that if science exposed man's in
ability to control his own destiny, then the proletariat
was no less emasculate.

Hence, the move toward egalitar

ianism continued apace.

Ibsen's dramatizing of the thoughts of these
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three philosophers has put into perspective, in the his
torical period in which they wrote, the social and psych
ological implications of their observations.

Though

Schopenhauer slightly predated Ibsen's "golden period"
and Freud succeeded it, their incisive scrutiny along
with that of Kierkegaard, has aptly characterized this
period as the last agony of an epoch.
Along with the debilitation of deity went the
pessimistic realization that, with God so effete, man
himself was without the power of self-determination, was
without free will.

Schopenhauer epitomized this totally

unredeeming view; but man--unable to long endure such un
remitting pessimism—began to turn toward the half-way

house of Kierkegaardian existentialism, where humanity
was provided at least with some degree of latitude in his
power to determine his own destiny.

And indeed Freud's

inquiry into the human psyche, though postulating a un
versal equation in biology, stimulus and response, none
theless, demonstrated as its own basic raison that to un

derstand one's own constitution was to somehow re-acquire
some of the lost magnificence of man.

That is to say,

when a man understands the working of his knee-joint, for

example, the discovery of its mechanical principle does
not render man any the more mechanical.

The fact that

the mind has the awesome power to contemplate itself con

templating itself, lends it a strength that cannot be de
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nied, if it is agreed that knowledge is power.
Into this cauldron came the chronicler Ihsen,

with an ear to the nineteenth-century winds of change,

hearing the still metamorphosing maelstrom of debate,
conditioned by years of theater management and nearly

half a century of successful playwrighting:

Thus he

wrote a masterful story of a group of people who were

caught in a volatile social flux.

Ibsen's masterpiece,

catching these tragic figures in their struggles, accom

plishes several objectives.

It shows how the dramatist,

perhaps before the historian, can discern with remark
able accuracy the historical significance of an era.
It shows how Ibsen, with exemplary virtuosity, was able

to correlate several conflicting philosophical views, and

even anticipate the trajectory of history (Freud's opus
magnum).

It is exhibit "A" offered as proof that Ibsen

was a playwright of classical proportions who could yet
claim that same popularity with the masses as have all
artists who have survived the test of time.
The demonstrated ease with which Hedda Gabler

has been explicated through these different perspectives
is impressive evidence to the multiplicity of Ibsen's vi
sion, his skills as an observer, and his talent as a

playwright of monumental capacity.

The immediacy of his

nineteenth century vision is apparent in his masterful
dramatization of the existential reality and the irre
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sistibility with which the dilemma of freedom dawned in

the affairs of man.

21

This "tragedy of freedom" is es

sentially a twentieth century phenomenon.
If one could characterize classical literature

as literature depicting the synthesis of the whole man;
as a composite of the head, the heart, and the body, each
representing the rational, the romantic, and the natural
ist view; if one could see the classical man as one who-

by virtue of biological, religious, and social tyranny-
has come by his "essence before existence," then one must
classify Hedda Gabler as a classical drama.

22

But the

prestidigitator Ibsen, who has been called, perhaps quite
justifiably, the father of modern drama, bridged that gap
that separates classical yesterday from contemporary to

day.

And he performed this feat by blending two funda

mentally alien philosophies; existentialism with its
existence-before-essence, and the naturalistic essence
before-existence.

Conceived on the classical soil of his

own milieu, his art adhered to the classical dicta of de

terminism and form; but as his creation took wing it un

21

A man is free, claim the existentialists, when

he chooses his own will over the claims of others and ac

cepts the fact of his own death.
22

York:

Wesley Barnes, Existentialism

(Woodbury, New

Barren's Educational Series, Inc., 1968).

The read

er is referred to this enlightening book for a comparison
of existentialistic and classical literature.
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derwent transformation and somewhere in flight it became
a manifesto of freedom, shaking loose the fetters of the

classical form, unfurling the pinions of existentialism,
and ushering in the era of modern drama.
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